Background: Facts On Wal-Mart’s History of Handling Store Security
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Internal documents showed that Wal-Mart was aware of crime problems at the stores:
In 1996, Wal-Mart’s vice president of loss prevention reported that an internal survey “showed that 80 percent of crimes at Wal-Mart were occurring not in the stores but outside their walls, either in the parking lots or around the exterior perimeter of the stores.” (Dave Gorman, “Loss Prevention Racks Up Success,” Security Management, March 1996.)
In 1995, in an internal memorandum, Ronald Williams, an assistant general counsel for Wal-Mart said to other company executives that “we are now on notice of the violence that is happening on our parking lots in the Houston area and we must therefore maintain security on these parking lots.” (The National Law Journal, September 2001.)
Wal-Mart had been aware of an effective solution:
Wal-Mart reported that, in 1994, one store in Florida had 226 car thefts, 25 purse snatchings, 32 burglaries, 14 armed robberies, and 3 assaults. Within four months of starting golf cart patrols in the parking lots, “the reported incidents for each of these crimes dropped to zero, and numbers have remained low.” (David Gorman, “Loss Prevention Racks Up Success,” Security Management, Mar 1996.)
Based on this survey which demonstrated the success of these patrols, Wal-Mart’s assistant general counsel recommended in 1995 that the company use golf cart patrols more extensively. (The National Law Journal, September 2001.)
Despite the effectiveness of active security measures, like roving security patrols, Wal-Mart did not universally adopt such measures.
From 1994 to 2000, Wal-Mart had only increased the percentage of stores having such patrols from 11 to 17 percent. (Judge J. Starcher, Concurring Opinion in Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, No. 26012, December 13, 2001 and Good Morning America, August 2000.)
Wal-Mart targets most of its store security effort on shoplifting instead of on protecting customers.
The security of customers and employees is handled by a department called Loss Prevention. The primary focus of this department appears to be implementing what company spokespeople have repeatedly referred to as an “aggressive” policy towards shoplifters. (The Herald - Rock Hill, S.C. July 11, 2004 and Orlando Business Journal, July 11, 2003.)
In fact, a representative of Wal-Mart in 2004 attributed extra police calls to Wal-Mart on the store's aggressive policy toward shoplifters. "You're going to see an increase in reporting of shoplifting calls and that goes back to our policy of zero tolerance," said spokeswoman Sharon Weber. (Alexandria Sage, “Crime linked to Wal-Mart Supercenters overwhelms small-town police,” Associated Press, May 22, 2004.)
Wal-Mart could take further steps to protect customers and employees.
In 1996, Wal-Mart claimed that it “targets its protective efforts on its most valuable resources: its 650,000 associates and its average of 60 million weekly customers. To that end, the chain has put in place a range of safety and security measures, including enhanced parking lot protection, child safety measures, and interior and exterior camera surveillance." (David Gorman, “Loss Prevention Racks Up Success,” Security Management, March 1996.)
However, Wal-Mart’s head of security admitted in 1996 that the stores’ security personnel did not regularly monitor video cameras on parking lots and store perimeters. This happened despite the company’s knowledge that 80 percent of crimes at Wal-Mart were occurring outside the stores. (David Gorman, “Loss Prevention Racks Up Success,” Security Management, March 1996.)
Moreover, Wal-Mart had not universally implemented what they evaluated as an effective deterrent against crime: golf-cart patrols. From 1994 to 2000, Wal-Mart had only increased the percentage of stores being patrolled from 11 to 17 percent. (The National Law Journal, September 3, 2001; Judge J. Starcher, Concurring Opinion in Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, No. 26012, December 13, 2001 and Good Morning America, August 2000.)
Internal Studies by Wal-Mart of Crime Have Been Destroyed/Not Made Public
David Gorman, former VP of Loss Prevention at Wal-Mart, admits crime survey data used and the official report prepared for Wal-Mart was destroyed. Only one page of that report has been made public which acknowledged that 80 percent of crime at Wal-Mart occurs outside of the stores in their parking lots. (Liptak v. Wal-Mart, Dave Gorman Deposition)
Wal-Mart admitted they have no company-wide written policy on store security for the general public or for its parking lots relating to “third-party criminal attacks” (Rosalinda Fernandez vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Deposition of Dave Gorman, March 26th, 1998).